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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION, ) 
Plaintiff- ) 
Appellant 
) 
vs Case No. 14499 
) 
FRANK S . BLAIR and AMERICAN 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, ) 
Defendants- ) 
Respondents 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
v 
Respondent, hereinafter called Blair, petitions 
this Court for rehearing upon the following ground: 
The Court erred in finding that the language in 
the lease regarding additional parking area, right-of-
way and driveway area is certain and specific• 
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays for rehearing and 
upon such rehearing the Court vacate its decision 
on file herein and for such other relief as may be 
proper. 
LA VAR E. STARK 
Attorney for Respondent 
2651 Washington Blvd. 
Suite #10 
Ogden# Utah 84401 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant 
vs 
FRANK S. BLAIR and AMERICAN 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendants-
Respondents 
Case No. 14499 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LANGUAGE 
IN THE LEASE REGARDING ADDITIONAL PARKING 
AREA, RIGHT OF WAY AND DRIVEWAY AREA IS 
CERTAIN AND SPECIFIC. 
The lease provides: 
"Parcel 2: Together with joint use with other 
tenants of Lessor of at least 20,000 square 
feet of additional parking area, right of way 
and driveway area located on Lots 25 to 30, 
inclusive, of said block 26, and upon property 
adjacent thereto on West." 
The following is a plot plan of the property: 
1 
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The question presented is: Where is Parcel 2? 
This Court found this language to be certain 
and specific and that the parking was to be located 
on Lots 25 to 30 and land adjacent on the west, 
and nowhere else. 
The lease language refers not only to parking 
but also to right of way and driveway area. The 
20,000 square foot area for parking was the same 
as the area for right of way and driveway. 
The usual and ordinary meaning of "right of way" 
is the right of passage over another man's ground. 
(Kleih v Van Schoyck, 27 NW2d 490, 250 Wis 413) 
The usual and ordinary meaning of "driveway" 
is a passage way, a travel way, a way of ingress 
and egress. (Frumin v May,, 251 SW2d 314, 36 Tenn. 
App 32) or a path leading from a garage or house 
to a street used especially by automobiles (Dalshe 
v Gormley, 25 Cal Rptr, 270, 375 P2d 174). 
So, the language in the lease granted parking, 
and the right of passage and passage way of ingress 
and egress or a path from the Bank to the street, and 
from the street to the Bank. The only way to and 
from 36th Street was over lots N or M or that part 
3 
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of the vacated alley next to 36th Street. The 
language in the lease was vague and unclear as to 
the location of the right of way and driveway. 
The Court held: 
"The District Court's construction of the 
language used by the parties requires the 
substitution of the word for' for the word 
TandT. All words used by the parties must, 
if possible, be given their usual and 
ordinary meaning and effect." 
The word "and" may mean "in addition to" as 
this Court has held (Bountiful v Swift, Utah, 535 
P2d 1236). However, the words "and" and "or" are 
frequently used interchangeably (State v Harwi, 
230 P 331, 117 Kan 74). Also, "and" is sometimes 
construed in the sense of "as well as" (Williams 
v United States, 87 P 647, 17 Okl 28). 
If we substitute the words "in addition to" 
for the word "and", as suggested by this Court, 
we have this result: The 20,000 square feet of 
parking, right of way and driveway is located on 
Lots 25 to 30 in addition to property adjacent thereto 
on the west. 
Does this mean that 19, 462.5 square feet 
of parking, right of way and driveway is located 
on Lots 25 to 30, and 537.5 square feet of parking, 
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right of way and driveway is located on adjacent 
land to the west? If this was the intention of 
the parties, they had only to say so. But where 
is the precise location of the 537.5 square feet? 
This language may mean that the 20,000 square 
feet of parking, right of way and driveway may be 
located anywhere on the larger parcel described 
as Lots 25 to 30 and property adjacent thereto on 
the west. 
If we substitute the words "or" for the word 
"and", we have this result: The 20,000 square feet 
of parking, right of way and driveway is located 
on Lots 25 to 30 £r on property adjacent thereto 
on the west. 
This may mean that all of the parking, right 
of way and driveway must be located on Lots 25 to 
30 (19, 462.5 square feet), or, if not there, then 
all of the parking, right of way and driveway must 
be located on land adjacent on the west. 
This may mean that the 20,000 square feet of 
parking, right of way and driveway be located 
anywhere on the larger parcel of Blair's land 
described as Lots 25 to 30 and property adjacent 
thereto on the west. 
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! 
If we substitute the words "as well as" in-
stead of "and", we have this result: The 20,000 
square feet of parking, right of way and driveway 
is located on Lots 25 to 30 as well as property 
adjacent thereto on the west. 
This construction does not precisely locate 
the 20,000 square feet. 
In the above examples, there would be no 
access to 36th Street. 
Other areas where the language is vague and 
unclear have to do with whether the north half of 
the vacated alley is part of Lots 25 to 30 (20, 
962.50 square feet), whether Lots 25 to 30 includes 
Lot N (22, 799.7 square feet). If so, there would 
be no need to mention additional adjacent property 
on the west. 
How much of the 20,000 square feet should be 
utilized for parking and where? How much of the 
20,000 square feet should be utilized for right of 
way and where? How much of the 20,000 square feet 
should be utilized for driveway, and where? 
CONCLUSION 
********** 
The language regarding Parcel 2 is vague and 
6 
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unclear and capable of more than one meaning. 
Without objection, interpretive evidence 
came in at the trial with regard to the Bank's 
intention to have access to and from 36th Street. 
This right of way and driveway, together with the 
parking comprised Parcel 2. Interpretive evidence 
was likewise admissable as to the location of the 
parking area. 
The evidence at least sustains the proposi-
tion that Blair was to have flexibility in locating 
the 20,000 square foot area on the south part of 
the property, with the Bank having reasonable 
access to and from 36th Street. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1977. 
LA VAR E. STARK 
Attorney for Respondent 
2651 Washington Blvd. 
Suite #10 
Ctefden , Utah 84401 
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